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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH
CAROLINA PROPERTY LAW
WHERE’S THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH
CAROLINA?*
JOHN V. ORTH**
From its creation in 1818 until the creation of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals in 1967, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was the state’s sole appellate court. As such, it was solely
responsible for the development of the state’s common law. At
first, the creation of an intermediate appellate court did not
change that situation. Created to address the burgeoning number
of appeals following the great expansion of federal rights for
criminal defendants in the mid-twentieth century, the Court of
Appeals was originally intended to be a court for the correction
of error rather than a precedent-setting court. But in 1989 the
Supreme Court held that where one panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided an issue, subsequent panels are bound by
that precedent unless it is overturned by a higher court. From
1989 until today, state law has in many instances been shaped by
decisions of three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals rather
than by the seven-member Supreme Court. This Article focuses
on several significant decisions concerning basic property law
that have been made by panels of the Court of Appeals and
explores the consequences of delegating the Supreme Court’s
precedent-setting function to panels of the intermediate appellate
court.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was first created by
statute in 1818.1 Prior to that year, the Court of Conference,
composed of superior court judges, had functioned as the state’s
highest court.2 As constituted by the 1818 court act, the Supreme
Court was the state’s only appellate court.3 As such, it was solely
responsible for maintaining and developing the state’s common law.
The court continued in that role, with enhanced status after 1868,
when the state’s new constitution vested in it “the Judicial power of
the State[.]”4
In 1965, the North Carolina Constitution was amended to
reconstitute the judicial branch. The amendment created the
1. Act of Nov. 17, 1818, ch. 1, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3–5.
2. Originally created by statute in 1799, Act of Nov. 18, 1799, ch. 4, 1799 N.C. Sess.
Laws 133, 133–35, the court did not receive the official name of Court of Conference until
1801, Act of Nov. 16, 1801, ch. 12, § 1, 1801 N.C. Sess. Laws 176, 176. In 1805, the court’s
title was changed to Supreme Court, Act of Nov. 18, 1805, ch. 1, § 1, 1805 N.C. Sess. Laws
1, but it continued to be composed of superior court judges and to be commonly referred
to as the Court of Conference. See Walter Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina, 4
GREEN BAG 457, 459 (1892).
3. Act of Nov. 17, 1818, ch. 1, 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, 3–5.
4. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 4 (“The Judicial power of the State shall be vested
in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, Superior Courts, courts of
Justices of the Peace, and Special Courts.”). Among the various courts referred to, only
the Supreme Court was an appellate court of general jurisdiction. Id. § 10
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, an[y] decision
of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference; but no issue of fact
shall be tried before this court: and the court shall have power to issue any
remedial writs necessary, to give it a general supervision and control of the inferior
courts.
Id.
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Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice, consisting of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.5 The amendment
authorized a Supreme Court composed of up to nine justices,
although the court continues to function with seven, as it has since
1937.6 On January 1, 1967, legislation provided for a Court of Appeals
staffed with six judges.7 In 1969, the number of Court of Appeals
judges increased to nine;8 in 1977, to twelve;9 and, in 2000, to fifteen.10
The Court of Appeals sits in panels consisting of three judges each,
assigned by the Chief Judge, “in such fashion that each member sits a
substantially equal number of times with each other member.”11
Rotation of the judges was intended “to prevent the growth of
diverging bodies of case law among various panels of fixed
membership.”12
On its creation, the Court of Appeals was expected to be
primarily responsible for the correction of errors made at the trial
level, leaving the Supreme Court with responsibility for review of
“those cases having [the] added dimension of general jurisprudential
significance[,]” whether decisions of a trial court or of the Court of
5. See AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1776–1996, at
14 (John L. Sanders & John F. Lomax, Jr. eds., 1997). After the revision of the North
Carolina Constitution, approved by the voters on November 3, 1970 (effective January 1,
1971), the provision appears in the North Carolina Constitution at article IV, section 5. See
JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONSTITUTION 130 (2d ed. 2013).
6. Act of Feb. 3, 1937, ch. 16, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 47, 47 (increasing number of
justices from five to seven, as authorized by a constitutional amendment adopted in 1935);
see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 444, sec. 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 745,
745; see also AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 5,
at 8.
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (2015) (“The Court of Appeals is created effective
January 1, 1967. It shall consist initially of six judges . . . .”).
8. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1969, the number of judges is increased to nine . . . .”).
9. Id. (“Effective January 1, 1977, the number of judges is increased to 12 . . . .”). For
the early history of the Court of Appeals, see DAVID M. BRITT, COURT OF APPEALS OF
NORTH CAROLINA: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 1967–1992, at 2–8 (1992).
10. § 7A-16 (“On or after December 15, 2000, the Governor shall appoint three
additional judges to increase the number of judges to 15.”). But see Act to Reduce the
Number of Judges on the Court of Appeals to Twelve, sec. 1, § 7A-16, 2017-2 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 37, 37 (LexisNexis) (“On or after January 1, 2017, whenever the seat of an
incumbent judge becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the judge’s term due to death,
resignation, retirement, impeachment, or removal pursuant to G.S. 7A-374.2(8) of the
incumbent judge, that seat is abolished until the total number of Court of Appeals seats is
decreased to 12.”).
11. § 7A-16.
12. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COURTS COMMISSION TO THE
NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (1967).
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Appeals.13 In consequence, there was an appeal of right from the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court in any case that “directly
involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the
United States or of this State.”14 In addition, there was an appeal of
right from any decision of the Court of Appeals “[i]n which there is a
dissent[.]”15 In other cases that have “significant public interest” or
that involve “legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State,” the Supreme Court could certify a cause
for review on the motion of a party or on its own motion.16 In a few
13. Id. at 13. As the Courts Commission itself recognized, “These two functions of
course are frequently carried on simultaneously. In many cases the general law is clarified
or expanded in the very process of correcting trial court error in the individual case.” Id. at
12.
14. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 (2015). The complete grounds for appeals as of right from
Court of Appeals decisions are as follows:
Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28 [concerning decisions of Court of Appeals on
post-trial motions for appropriate relief, valuation of exempt property, or courtsmartial], an appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of the
Court of Appeals rendered in a case: (1) Which directly involves a substantial
question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, or (2)
In which there is a dissent.
Id.; See also Robert Orr, What Exactly Is a “Substantial Constitutional Question” for
Purposes of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court?, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 211
(2011) (analyzing the “statutory right of appeal based on a substantial constitutional
question”). North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-30 was amended in December
2016 to render unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in which there
was a dissent “until after the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered a decision in
the case . . . or until after the time for filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the
Court of Appeals has expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for
rehearing.” Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), § 7A-30(2), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10,
32.
15. § 7A-30; see Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), § 7A-30, 2016 N.C. Sess.
Laws 10, 32; see also N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b); Thomas L. Fowler, Appellate Rule 16(b): The
Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of Appeals, 24 N.C.
CENT. L. J. 1, 5 (2001).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b)(1)–(2) (2015). “[T]he Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for
review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the Court
of Appeals.” Id. § 7A-31(a). Certification before determination by the Court of Appeals
may be allowed
when in the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The subject matter of the appeal
has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major
significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) Delay in final adjudication is
likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause substantial harm, or (4)
The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious
administration of justice requires certification.
§ 7A-31(b).
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cases, there was an appeal of right from a trial court directly to the
Supreme Court.17
In 1989, in In re Appeal from Civil Penalty,18 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held: “where a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel
of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been
overturned by a[n intervening decision from] a higher court.”19
Although this holding made theoretically impossible “diverging
bodies of case law”20 among different panels of the Court of
Appeals,21 the Chief Judge continued to rotate the judges among the
Certification after determination by the Court of Appeals may be allowed when in
the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The subject matter of the appeal has
significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal principles of major
significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of
Appeals appears to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.
§ 7A-31(c).
17. § 7A-27(a)(1) (sentences of death); § 7A-27(a)(2)–(3) (certain decisions of the
business court); § 7A-27(a1), repealed by Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), § 7A27(a1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31 (decisions by a special three-judge Superior Court
holding a state statute “facially invalid” for violation of the North Carolina Constitution or
federal law). § 7A-27 was amended in December 2016 to abolish the appeal of right to the
Supreme Court from decisions by the special three-judge Superior Court holding a state
statute unconstitutional, so any appeal would now lie to the Court of Appeals. Act of Dec.
16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), § 7A-27(a1), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31.
18. 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
19. Id. at 384, 379 S.E.2d at 37 (citing Monroe Cty., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
690 F. 2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1982); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transp., Inc., 618 F.2d 1037,
1041 (4th Cir. 1980)). There is an exception to the precedent-setting function of the Court
of Appeals when a decision of a panel is affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. In
that case, the judgment below is affirmed “without precedential value.” E.g., Faires v.
State Bd. of Elections, 368 N.C. 825, 825, 784 S.E.2d 463, 464 (2016) (citing State v. Long,
365 N.C. 5, 705 S.E.2d 735 (2011) (per curiam); State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 258 S.E.2d
71 (1979) (per curiam)); State v. Franklin, 367 N.C. 183, 183, 752 S.E.2d 143, 143 (2013)
(citing Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 365 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011);
Goldston v. State, 364 N.C. 416, 700 S.E.2d 223 (2010)); see also John V. Orth, “Without
Precedential Value”—When the Justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court Are Equally
Divided, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1732–38 (2015) (criticizing the denial of precedential value
to appellate decisions affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court); infra Part VI
(discussing whether the Court of Appeals sitting en banc would be bound by a precedent
set by a three-judge panel).
20. N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 7.
21. For examples of real or apparent divergences among panels of the Court of
Appeals, see John V. Orth, Why the North Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a
Procedure for Sitting En Banc, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1981, 1982–84 (1997). At the time In re
Civil Penalty was decided, the Court of Appeals, staffed by twelve judges, sat in four
panels; since 2000, when the size of the court was increased to fifteen, it sits in five panels.
It is uncertain how the court will function as its authorized strength is progressively
reduced. Cf. supra note 10.
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panels.22 Since the Court of Appeals originally had no procedure for
sitting en banc, the decision of one panel of the Court of Appeals was
the decision of the entire court. As a result, since 1989, North
Carolina common law has been, in significant cases, developed by
three-judge panels of rotating membership rather than by the sevenmember Supreme Court.
Recently, significant changes have been made to North
Carolina’s appellate procedure. On December 16, 2016, the North
Carolina General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 4, authorizing the
Court of Appeals to sit “en banc to hear or rehear any cause upon a
vote of the majority of the judges of the court.”23 This law would
change the appellate procedure that is described in this Article and
that was followed in the cases discussed herein. The new statute
would allow the Court of Appeals sitting en banc to rehear a case
decided by a panel that involved a constitutional issue.24 It would also
render unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in
which there was a dissent “until after the Court of Appeals sitting en
banc has rendered a decision in the case . . . or until after the time for
filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals has
expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for
rehearing.”25
A suit that makes a “facial challenge” to the constitutionality of
an act of the General Assembly is heard by a special three-judge
superior court.26 Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 4, if that court
held the act unconstitutional, there was an appeal of right to the
Supreme Court.27 Senate Bill 4 abolishes the appeal of right to the
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (2015).
23. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(a), § 7A-16, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 30. The
en banc procedure that is authorized by this statute is implemented by North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 31.1, adopted by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on December 22, 2016. N.C. SUPREME COURT, ORDER ADOPTING RULE 31.1
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 369 N.C. ___, ___ (Dec.
22, 2016) http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/Rule-31.1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/M9L4-C6R4].
24. See Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), § 7A-27, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31.
25. Id. sec. 22.(c), § 7A-30, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws at 32.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2015) (providing that “any facial challenge to the
validity of an act of the General Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of
Wake County and shall be heard and determined by a three-judge panel of the Superior
Court of Wake County”).
27. § 7A-27(a1), repealed by Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(b), § 7A-27(a1),
2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31 (providing an appeal of right in case of decision by a special
three-judge superior court holding a state statute “facially invalid” for violation of the
North Carolina Constitution or federal law).
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Supreme Court, so any appeal now lies to the Court of Appeals.28
Similarly, appeals from a decision of the special three-judge superior
court that declared invalid an act redistricting congressional or
legislative districts, once directed to the Supreme Court,29 are now
also routed to the Court of Appeals.30
The present Article focuses on several significant decisions
concerning basic North Carolina property law that were made by
three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals and not reviewed by the
Supreme Court. The cases decided a wide array of basic property
issues: (1) whether the state is constitutionally required to pay interest
on unclaimed personal property in its possession; (2) whether a
commercial tenant may waive a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages
in case of tenant abandonment; (3) whether the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities applies to a right of first refusal in a lease; (4)
whether a perpetual private noncharitable trust violates the state
constitutional prohibition of perpetuities; and (5) whether an action
to enjoin a continuing encroachment on an easement is subject to the
running of a six-year statute of limitations. The decisions in all these
cases are subject to criticism, but the object of this Article is not to
advocate for any particular result.
Instead, this Article explores the consequences of effectively
delegating the Supreme Court’s precedent-setting function to the
intermediate appellate court. It notes the effect of precedents set by
Court of Appeals decisions in cases in which no review was sought by
the Supreme Court, as well as in cases in which appeals were
dismissed or petitions for discretionary review were denied. Finally,
this Article concludes that the constitutional plan of relieving the
Supreme Court of the burden of correcting error in order to allow the
court the opportunity to develop the state’s common law has been
severely compromised.

28. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, sec. 22.(b), 2016 N.C. Session Laws 10 at 31.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-2.5.
30. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(f), § 120-2.5, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10 at 33
(repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-2.5).
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I. UNCLAIMED PERSONAL PROPERTY—STATE’S DUTY TO PAY
INTEREST
In 2008, in Rowlette v. State,31 a panel of the Court of Appeals
held that the state’s retention of interest earned on unclaimed
personal property in its possession is not an unconstitutional taking.
In Rowlette, Plaintiffs owned personal property that was
transferred to the custody of the state treasurer pursuant to the
Unclaimed Property Act.32 While in the custody of the treasurer,
Plaintiffs’ property paid dividends to the state and accrued “funds”—
presumably interest.33 Having proved their ownership to the
satisfaction of the treasurer, Plaintiffs received the value of their
property as it was when the treasurer first took custody of it but not
the dividends and interest that it had produced since then.34 Pursuant
to the statute, the treasurer holds unclaimed property “without
liability for income or gain.”35 Plaintiffs claimed that the treasurer’s
retention of the dividends and interest was an unconstitutional taking
under both the state and the federal constitutions.36 The superior
court judge dismissed the complaint.37
31. 188 N.C. App. 712, 656 S.E.2d 619 (2008), perm. app. granted, disc. rev. denied, 362
N.C. 474, 666 S.E.2d 487 (2008).
32. Id. at 713, 656 S.E.2d at 620; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 116B-51 to -80. While
raising a presumption that unclaimed property has been abandoned, § 116B-53(c), the
statute nonetheless characterizes the state’s possession of the property as mere “custody,”
§ 116B-56(a), -63(b). The drafters of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, on which the
North Carolina statute is based, maintain that “[t]he owner’s rights are never cut off;
under this Act, the owner’s rights exist in perpetuity.” UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 16
cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995). I have previously argued that Rowlette was wrongly
decided. John V. Orth, Interest Follows Principal: Why North Carolina Should Pay Interest
on Unclaimed Personal Property, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 321, 331–32 (2015). I do not
intend to re-argue that point. I mention Rowlette in this Article as an example of a
significant property issue resolved by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals and
unreviewed by the Supreme Court.
33. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 712, 656 S.E.2d at 620.
34. Id. at 712–13, 656 S.E.2d at 620.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT § 116B-64.
36. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 714, 656 S.E.2d at 620; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law
of the land.”). Although the North Carolina Constitution lacks an express takings clause
comparable to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the principle has
been found implicit in the law of the land clause. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 5, at 70.
37. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 714, 656 S.E.2d at 620–21. From October 1, 2015 to
December 16, 2016, cases that challenged a state statute under the state constitution or
federal law were assigned to a special three-judge superior court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly shall
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The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected Plaintiffs’ claim and
affirmed the dismissal of their complaint.38 Stressing the presumption
that state legislation is constitutional39 and that unclaimed property
was “abandoned,”40 the court held that Plaintiffs’ loss was attributable
to their own “neglect.”41 Citing several United States Supreme Court
decisions, the Court of Appeals relied principally on Texaco, Inc. v.
Short,42 which upheld the constitutionality of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse
Act.43 That statute provided that a severed mineral interest that is
unused for twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to the
current surface owner, unless the mineral owner filed a timely
statement of claim in the registry of deeds.44 Quoting Texaco, the
Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he [United States] Supreme Court
‘has never required the State to compensate [an] owner for the
consequences of his own neglect . . . .’ ”45 The Court of Appeals also
relied on decisions of appellate courts in Pennsylvania, Indiana,
Louisiana, and Ohio that upheld the retention of interest on
unclaimed property.46
be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and
determined by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County.”). If that court
found the statute “facially invalid,” there was an appeal of right to the Supreme Court. Id.
For criticism of this statute, see Joshua A. Yost, Comment, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix
It”: Evaluating North Carolina’s Creation of a Three-Judge Court to Hear Constitutional
Challenges to State Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893, 1896 (2015). Now, because of legislation
passed on December 16, 2016, cases that challenge the constitutionality of a statute are
directed to the Court of Appeals. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(c), § 7A-27(a1),
2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 31.
38. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 723, 656 S.E.2d at 626.
39. Id. at 714–15, 656 S.E.2d at 621 (“In challenging the constitutionality of a statute,
the burden of proof is on the challenger, and the statute must be upheld unless its
unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable
doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable ground.” (quoting Guilford Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684–85
(1993))).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116B-53(c) (stating that “[p]roperty is presumed
abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner” over specified periods).
41. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 723, 656 S.E.2d at 626. No reason for the plaintiffs’
failure to communicate with the institutions that held their property within the time
necessary to prevent transfer appears in the opinion.
42. 454 U.S. 516 (1982); see Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 717–20, 656 S.E.2d at 622–24
(citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 518, 526, 530 (1982)).
43. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518.
44. Id.
45. Rowlette, 188 N.C. App. at 720, 656 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Texaco, 454 U.S. at
530).
46. Id. at 720–22, 656 S.E.2d at 624–25 (citing Smolow v. Hafer, 867 A.2d 767 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005); Smyth v. Carter, 845 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Hooks v.
Kennedy, 06-0541 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07); 961 So.2d 425; Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of
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Plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, but the court dismissed
their appeal of right,47 presumably finding that the constitutional
question was not substantial,48 and denied discretionary review,49
presumably finding that the case was not significant or that it did not
involve an important legal principle.50 Pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Civil Penalty, the decision in Rowlette is
binding on all other panels of the Court of Appeals until overturned
by a higher court.51
Had the Supreme Court reviewed Rowlette, it might have noted
that other courts have found the constitutional question concerning
interest on unclaimed property to be of great significance. When the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision that was
relied on in Rowlette, it declared that the state’s retention of interest
“strikes at the core of the concept of private property because, at a
stroke, the [Ohio] General Assembly severed the link between the
owner of an asset and the income produced by that asset.”52 The Ohio
Supreme Court distinguished the Ohio Unclaimed Property Act from
Commerce, 2007-Ohio-3219, 2007 WL 1821306 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Sogg
v. Zurz, 121 Ohio St.3d 449, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 2009)). At the time the
decision in Rowlette was filed on February 19, 2008, the appeal in Sogg was pending. See
Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 116 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2007-Ohio-6140, 876 N.E.2d 968,
968 (Ohio 2007) (allowing appeal). On April 8, 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed
the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision. Sogg, 121 Ohio St.3d at ¶ 16, 905 N.E.2d at 193.
47. Rowlette v. State, 362 N.C. 474, 474, 666 S.E.2d 487, 488 (2008).
48. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that for there to be an appeal of
right from a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, the constitutional question
“must be real and substantial rather than superficial and frivolous” or “a constitutional
question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination.”
State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 305, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1968). Since Rowlette was a case of
first impression, the appeal of right must have been dismissed on the former ground. The
United States Supreme Court has held that where the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has dismissed an appeal of right on a constitutional question, the dismissal is a ruling by
the state Supreme Court on the merits, thus permitting United States Supreme Court
review. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 138 (1986). However,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina does not recognize dismissal as a precedent. See
Jenkins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 324 N.C. 394, 400, 378 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1989) (stating
that denial of discretionary review has “no value as a precedent”).
49. Rowlette, 362 N.C. at 474, 666 S.E.2d at 488.
50. See supra note 48 for discussion of dismissals’ precedential value; see also supra
note 16 (describing instances in which the Supreme Court may allow discretionary
review).
51. See In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)
(“[A] panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the
same court addressing the same question, but in a different case, unless overturned by an
intervening decision from a higher court.”).
52. Sogg v. Zurz, 121 Ohio St.3d 449, ¶ 6, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ohio
2009).
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the statutes of other states because the Ohio statute “does not contain
a presumption of abandonment.”53
In a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in 2013, Judge Richard Posner, long a leader in the field of law
and economics,54 held that Indiana’s retention of interest earned on
unclaimed property was an unconstitutional taking.55 Posner agreed
with the Ohio Supreme Court that interest is linked to principal: “[I]f
you own a deposit account that pays interest, you own the interest.”56
Posner observed that “[a]bandonment of property other than as a
consequence of death without a valid will or heirs means at common
law a voluntary relinquishment of ownership” and described the
presumption of abandonment in many unclaimed property acts a
“misunderstanding of the concept of abandonment.”57
Following Rowlette, any subsequent constitutional challenge to
North Carolina’s retention of interest on unclaimed personal property
would necessarily be rejected by the lower courts. Only a very
determined and well-resourced plaintiff would commence such a
challenge in the hope that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
would hear an appeal from the inevitable, unanimous adverse
judgment in the Court of Appeals.58 As a practical matter, the three-

53. Id. at ¶ 9, 905 N.E.2d at 190–91 (quoting Sogg v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007Ohio-3219, 2007 WL 1821306, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Sogg, 121 Ohio
St.3d 449, 2009-Ohio-1526, 905 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 2009)).
54. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, LAW PROFESSORS: THREE CENTURIES OF SHAPING
AMERICAN LAW 299–300 (2017) (“Posner is generally credited with the invention or at
least the popularization of Law and Economics, the jurisprudential strain within American
Legal Education that argued that American law in general, and the American common
law in particular, was best understood as the application of cost-benefit analysis to social
problems, in a search for the best means of wealth maximization or efficiency.”) Joining in
Posner’s opinion was Judge Frank Easterbrook, Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 578
(7th Cir. 2013), a jurist also noted for his use of economic analysis of law. See generally
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991) (applying economic and legal doctrines to “conclude that
corporate law has an economic structure [which] increases the wealth of all by supplying
the rules that investors would select if it were easy to contract more fully”).
55. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d. at 580.
56. Id. The concept is hardly original. See Beckford v. Tobin (1749) 27 Eng. Rep.
1049, 1051; 1 Ves. Sen. 308, 310 (“[I]nterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the
body.”). Posner admitted that “[t]he state can charge a fee for custodianship and for
searching for the owner, but the interest on the principal in a bank account is not a fee for
those services.” Cerajeski, 735 F.3d. at 583.
57. Cerajeski, 735 F.3d at 582. For a discussion of unclaimed property acts, see JOHN
V. ORTH, REAPPRAISALS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY 78–82 (2010).
58. For an example of such a “deep pocketed plaintiff,” see the discussion of Duke
Energy Carolinas v. Gray, infra notes 207–15 and accompanying text.
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judge panel of the Court of Appeals made the final decision in a case
that concerned the constitutional protection of property.
II. TENANT ABANDONMENT—LANDLORD’S DUTY TO
MITIGATE—WAIVER BY TENANT
In 2006, in Sylva Shops Limited Partnership v. Hibbard,59 a
panel of the Court of Appeals held that a clause in a commercial
lease in which a tenant waives the landlord’s duty to mitigate
damages in a case of tenant abandonment is not contrary to public
policy and is enforceable.
In Sylva Shops, Defendants entered into a five-year lease in
Plaintiff’s shopping center to operate a restaurant.60 Within six
months, the business failed, leaving four and a half years remaining
on the lease.61 Plaintiff made some effort to find a replacement
tenant62 but refused to reduce the rent below that originally agreed to
by Defendants, and months passed before a new tenant was found.63
Plaintiff sued for unpaid rent and relied on a lease provision that
“Landlord shall have no obligations to mitigate Tenant’s damages by
reletting the Demised Premises.”64 Holding the proviso invalid, the
superior court judge ordered a trial to determine the amount of
damages that Plaintiff could have avoided by proper acts in
mitigation, and reduced Plaintiff’s recovery to that extent.65
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Defendants liable for
the entire amount, without offset.66 The court began its analysis by
implicitly recognizing that a lease is a contract, quoting an earlier
59. 175 N.C. App. 423, 623 S.E.2d 785 (2006).
60. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787–88.
61. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 788.
62. Id. Plaintiff’s leasing agent “placed a ‘For Lease’ sign in the window of the space,
sent mailings to national tenants, and called other local businesses about leasing the
space.” Id.
63. Id. Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s failure to find a replacement tenant resulted
from its “unwillingness to agree to a lower rent.” Id.
64. Id. at 424, 426, 623 S.E.2d at 788–89. A contractual waiver of the duty to mitigate
should be distinguished from the waiver that occurs when a defendant fails to assert at
trial the affirmative defense of the duty to mitigate. See Jacqueline Sandler, Note, Waiving
the Duty to Mitigate in Commercial Leases, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 647, 649 n.4
(2014). Although commonly referred to as a duty to mitigate damages, no true duty is
involved, in the sense that failure to mitigate is actionable. In fact, failure to mitigate simply
offsets the landlord’s damages to the extent of value received, or that could by reasonable
efforts have been received. See Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon a
Tenant’s Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 721, 724 (2000).
65. Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787.
66. Id. at 433, 623 S.E.2d at 787.
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Supreme Court of North Carolina opinion: “Liberty to contract
carries with it the right to exercise poor judgment as well as good
judgment. It is the simple law of contracts that as a man consents to
bind himself, so shall he be bound.”67 It then acknowledged that
North Carolina has adopted from contract law the duty of mitigation
of damages in all leases, commercial as well as residential.68
Nonetheless, reverting to the principle of freedom of contract, the
court held that it was not contrary to public policy to contract away
that duty in commercial leases,69 analogizing it to a contract
exculpating a person from the results of ordinary negligence.70 The
court cited appellate court cases allowing waiver of the duty to
mitigate from appellate courts in Arkansas, New York, Ohio, and
Texas,71 while recognizing that the Texas decision had been
superseded by statute.72 The Court of Appeals also recognized that a
federal district court predicted that New Jersey would not enforce a
covenant in a lease waiving the duty to mitigate.73
Although Defendants in Sylva Shops did not argue that the
provision against mitigation was the product of unequal bargaining
power, the court clearly would not have been receptive to that
argument given its observation that in commercial leases there is
“relatively equal bargaining power due to the availability of other

67. Id. at 427, 623 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 414, 35
S.E.2d 277, 283 (1945)).
68. Id. at 427, 623 S.E.2d at 789–90 (quoting Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 51, 284
S.E.2d 534, 537 (1981)).
69. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d at 787.
70. Id. at 428–29, 623 S.E.2d at 790. However, the court in Sylva Shops emphasized
“that this opinion does not address the viability of such a clause in a residential lease,
which presents an entirely different situation.” Id. at 429, 623 S.E.2d at 791.
71. Id. at 430, 623 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Weingarten/Arkansas, Inc. v. ABC Interstate
Theatres, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ark. 1991); Comar Babylon Co. v. Goldberg, 497
N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); New Towne Ltd. P’ship v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.,
680 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades
Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. 1997)).
72. Id. (citing Lunsford Consulting Grp. v. Crescent Real Estate Funding VIII, 77
S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.006(a)–(b)
(West 2016, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“A landlord has a duty to mitigate
damages if a tenant abandons the leased premises in violation of the lease. A provision of
a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under
this section is void.”).
73. Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. at 430, 623 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Drutman Realty Co.
v. Jindo Corp., 865 F.Supp. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding under New Jersey law that
parties to a commercial lease may not contract to relieve the landlord of its duty to
mitigate under New Jersey law)).
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space and the fact that neither party is compelled to make a deal.”74
Nor did the court find it relevant that the lease also included a
covenant against tenant transfer by assignment or sublease without
the landlord’s prior written consent, which consent could be withheld
in the landlord’s “sole discretion.”75 “This Court has previously
upheld such clauses [against tenant transfer without landlord’s
consent] even when they do not place any limitations on the
landlord’s ability to withhold consent to an assignment of the lease.”76
The court’s decision in Sylva Shops was not reviewed by the Supreme
Court: Defendants did not petition for discretionary review, and the
Supreme Court did not exercise its discretion to take the case on its
own motion.77
Although not a constitutional decision like Rowlette, Sylva Shops
was probably of more immediate practical consequence. Without a
contrary decision by a higher court, the precedent it set was
necessarily followed the next year in Kotis Properties, Inc. v. Casey’s,
Inc.,78 which also went unreviewed by the Supreme Court. Authors of
an influential treatise on North Carolina property law promptly
advised lawyers for commercial landlords to include provisions in their
standard leases that “limit[] mitigation requirements in the event of a
tenant’s breach,”79 while small business owners were cautioned to
“strive—in spite of unequal bargaining power—to require some
reasonable mitigation requirements of lessors.”80
Right or wrong, the decision in Sylva Shops would have
benefitted from Supreme Court review.81 While Defendants could
74. Id. at 429, 623 S.E.2d at 791.
75. Id. at 430–31, 623 S.E.2d at 791–92.
76. Id. at 431, 623 S.E.2d at 792 (citing Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 49, 284 S.E.2d
534, 536 (1981)).
77. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may, in
its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the
Court of Appeals.”).
78. 183 N.C. App. 617, 624, 645 S.E.2d 138, 142–43 (2007) (citing Sylva Shops, 175
N.C. App. at 432, 623 S.E.2d at 792).
79. See JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH
CAROLINA § 12.28, p. 12-67 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 6th ed.
Supp. 2016).
80. Id.
81. One commentator has argued that the Arkansas and New York cases, relied on by
the Court of Appeals are not directly on point. Sandler, supra note 64, at 655 n.55, 657
n.63. That commentator points out that Weingarten/Arkansas, Inc. “was decided mostly
within the context of a surrender clause, so its wider applicability is limited . . . .” Id. at 657,
n.55. She also argues that Comar Babylon Co. must be placed in the context of
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certainly have refused Plaintiff’s lease and gone elsewhere, it is
questionable that the parties had “relatively equal bargaining
power.”82 Plaintiff was a Wal-Mart shopping center,83 while
Defendants were small business owners.84 Critics of the decision have
contended that the rule governing residential leases should be
extended to commercial leases, arguing that “[t]here should be little or
no distinction between treatment of residential leases (where the duty
to mitigate cannot be waived) and commercial leases involving ‘momand-pop’ tenants.”85 Of course, not all commercial tenants lack
bargaining power: grocery store chains or large department stores may
have more bargaining power than operators of single malls or shopping
centers.86 The difficulty of calibrating a rule depending on bargaining
power has led one commentator to advocate a “blanket rule” rendering
all such provisions void.87
Perhaps more significant is the societal interest in avoiding
economic waste when premises are left unoccupied. It is precisely this
concern that led to the adoption of a duty to mitigate in contract law on
the ground that damages should be compensatory rather than punitive.
As leases came to be seen as contractual, the duty from contract law
was adopted into property law.88 However, commercial leases raise
issues specific to the real estate market,89 some of them demonstrated
in Sylva Shops. If landlords are held to a duty to mitigate, how
aggressively must they seek a replacement tenant? Must landlords
accept offers to rent for less than the amount in the abandoning
tenant’s lease?90 And does the contract theory of anticipatory breach91
disagreement among New York courts over whether the duty to mitigate applies to
commercial landlords. Id. at 657 n.63.
82. See Sylva Shops, 175 N.C. App. 423, 429, 623 S.E.2d 785, 791 (2006).
83. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d 785 at 787–88.
84. Id. at 424, 623 S.E.2d 785 at 787 (identifying Defendants as “Loanne G. Hibbard,
Stanley L. Hibbard, and Linda Gedney”).
85. WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, § 12.28, p. 12-67.
86. See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478, 479 (Ga. 1991) (involving
a tenant grocery store that drafted the lease and a landlord that agreed to construct a
building for the tenant according to the tenant’s plans).
87. See Sandler, supra note 64, at 668–71.
88. For a critical discussion of the concept that a lease is “like any other contract,” see
ORTH, supra note 57, at 47–55.
89. A lease is a conveyance as well as a contract. See, e.g., Strader v. Sunstates Corp.,
129 N.C. App. 562, 570, 500 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1998) (“A lease is a contract which contains
both property rights and contractual rights.”).
90. On the one hand, the rent from the replacement tenant plus the damages owed by
the abandoning tenant (if collectable) would make the landlord whole. On the other hand,
a reduction of the rent for the replacement tenant would put downward pressure on rent

95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017)

1576

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

also apply to the damages calculation if the tenant abandons years
before the expiration of the lease? These are questions the Supreme
Court could have answered had it reviewed the case.
The interaction between ex ante waiver of the landlord’s duty to
mitigate and the covenant against tenant transfer without consent,
particularly if consent could be refused arbitrarily, deserved further
review. The Court of Appeals in Sylva Shops simply cited a 1981 Court
of Appeals decision holding that, in the absence of a provision that
consent would not be unreasonably withheld, the landlord’s decision
could be based on “arbitrary considerations of personal taste,
sensibility, or convenience.”92 The issue is unsettled elsewhere.93 The
Second Restatement of Property adopts the position that “the
landlord’s consent to an alienation by the tenant cannot be withheld
unreasonably,”94 while acknowledging that this is the “minority view.”95
In England, there is a presumption that consent to assigning or
subleasing may not be unreasonably refused.96 Without the ability to
transfer the tenancy or to require mitigation, a tenant whose business
has failed is left with few options other than bankruptcy.97
for comparable property and might adversely affect other tenants in the landlord’s
property.
91. See Anticipatory Breach, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A breach
of contract caused by a party’s anticipatory repudiation, i.e., unequivocally indicating that
the party will not perform when performance is due. Under these circumstances, the
nonbreaching party may elect to treat the repudiation as an immediate breach and sue for
damages.”)
92. Isbey v. Crews, 55 N.C. App. 47, 49, 284 S.E.2d 534, 536–37 (1981); see also Sylva
Shops Ltd. P’ship v. Hibbard, 175 N.C. App. 423, 431, 623 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2006). Isbey was
decided before In re Civil Penalty and was not reviewed by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.
93. See Dick Broad. Co. v. Oak Ridge FM, 395 S.W.3d 653, 656–57, 665–66 (Tenn. 2013)
(surveying recent decisions on the subject before rejecting Isbey and adopting “the ‘modern’
position . . . imposing an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in interpreting a silent
consent clause”).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1977). The ultimate issue is not whether a particular reason is reasonable or not, but
whose idea of reasonableness should prevail: that of the landlord or of the legal finder of
fact.
95. Id. § 15.2 reporter’s note 1; see also Brent C. Shaffer, Sublease Due Diligence, 17
PROB. & PROP. 44, 50 (2003) (“[C]ase law . . . in a slight minority of jurisdictions implies that
the prime landlord’s consent [to tenant transfer] can not [sic] be unreasonably withheld,
unless there is express language setting forth a stronger standard for consent.”) (citing
Landlord & Tenant Act 1927).
96. See WILLIAM GELDART, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 81 (D.C.M. Yardley
ed., 9th ed. 1984).
97. Defendants in Sylva Shops had petitioned for bankruptcy. Sylva Shops Ltd. P’ship
v. Hibbard, 175 N.C. App. 423, 425 n.1, 623 S.E.2d 785, 788, n.1 (2006).
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III. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES—OPTIONS IN LEASES
In 2012, in New Bar Partnership v. Martin,98 a panel of the
Court of Appeals held that the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities applies to a right of first refusal in a lease.
In 1988, Landlord leased commercial property to Tenant for a
five-year term with an option to renew the lease for three additional
five-year terms. The lease also granted Tenant an option to purchase99
during the first five-year term and a right of first refusal to purchase100
during any subsequent five-year term if the option to renew was
exercised.101 Before the expiration of the first five-year term, Tenant,
with Landlord’s consent, transferred to an Assignee all its interest in
the lease, including Tenant’s option to renew and right of first
refusal.102 At the same time, Landlord granted Assignee an option to
renew the lease for two additional five-year terms.103 In 2002,
Landlord extended Assignee’s option to renew for two additional
five-year terms.104 In 2004, Landlord transferred title to the property
to Landlord’s son (“Trustee”) to hold in a family trust.105 In 2010,
Trustee transferred title to a limited liability corporation (“LLC”)
with himself as manager thereof.106 As manager, he entered into a
contract of sale with Purchaser to close in 2011.107 Assignee, then in its
fifth five-year term, brought an action against the LLC and Purchaser

98. 221 N.C. App. 302, 729 S.E.2d 675 (2012).
99. Id. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679. “An option creates in the optionee a power to
compel the owner of property to sell it at a stipulated price whether or not he be willing to
part with ownership.” 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64 (A. James Casner ed.,
1952).
100. New Bar P’ship, 221 N.C. App. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679. A right of first refusal,
also known as a pre-emptive right, is a specific type of option to purchase. “The most
common right of first refusal becomes operative when the landlord receives an offer to
purchase the leased property from a third party. If the landlord decides to sell, he must
first offer the property to the tenant upon the terms of the third party’s bid.” ROBERT S.
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 9:9 (1980).
101. New Bar P’ship, 221 N.C. App. at 305, 729 S.E.2d at 679.
102. Id.
103. Id. By the terms of the agreement with Assignee, renewal was automatic, unless
Assignee served notice otherwise. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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to enforce Assignee’s right of first refusal.108 The superior court
dismissed the action.109
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the
right of first refusal violated the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, so was void ab initio.110 In its classic form, the Rule
Against Perpetuities provides: “No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest.”111 North Carolina applied the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities until 1995,112 when the General
Assembly adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
(USRAP),113 providing that an interest is good if it must vest either
within the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities or if
it actually vests within ninety years of its creation.114 USRAP
expressly excludes “nondonative transfers,”115 apparently leaving the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities in effect as to interests
created by such transfers. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the
right of first refusal in New Bar was created in 1993116 and remained
potentially exercisable until 2028, assuming all seven options to renew

108. Id. at 305–306, 729 S.E.2d at 679.
109. Id. at 304, 729 S.E.2d at 678. New Bar involved several other issues that
contributed to the dismissal, see id., but this Article is concerned only with the holding
regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities.
110. Id. at 314, 729 S.E.2d at 685.
111. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942).
112. For information on how the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was applied
before the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was adopted, see generally
Ronald K. Link, The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C. L. REV. 727
(1979) (collecting and analyzing North Carolina cases regarding the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
113. Act of June 7, 1995, ch. 190, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 346 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 to -22 (2016)). For a discussion of the statute, see generally
Ronald K. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1789–1800 (1996).
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15 (2015). The second prong of USRAP allows what is
commonly called a ninety year wait-and-see period for the validity of remote unvested
interests. Id.
115. § 41-18.
116. New Bar P’ship v. Martin, 221 N.C. App. 302, 314, 729 S.E.2d at 675, 685 (2012)
(“[T]he right of first refusal was created on 15 December 1993 when the lease was
renewed . . . .”). Actually, the right of first refusal was created in the 1988 lease, but did not
become exercisable until 1993, when the first option to renew was exercised. Id. at 304, 729
S.E.2d at 679. The perpetuities period begins to run when an option becomes exercisable.
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the lease were exercised.117 Because no life in being in 1993 was
implicated in the lease, the right of first refusal could only be valid
under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities if it had to vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after its creation.118 Although the
action was filed in 2011—within twenty-one years of 1993—the
interest was still held invalid because the common law Rule is “a rule
of logical proof[;]” for an interest to be valid it must appear at its
creation that it must necessarily vest, if at all, within the perpetuities
period.119 Review by the Supreme Court was not sought, and the court
did not take the case on its own motion.120
In 2015, in the absence of an intervening contrary decision by a
higher court, New Bar was followed in Khwaja v. Khan.121 The court
in Khwaja acknowledged that

117. Id. at 314, 729 S.E.2d at 685. At the time the complaint in New Bar was filed in
2011, four options to renew had been exercised: in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. Id. at 304,
729 S.E.2d at 679. Options to renew a lease are not subject to the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities. GRAY, supra note 111, § 230, at 231 (“It is no objection to a lease
that it contains [a covenant for renewal], if the entire control of the covenant is in the
hands of those persons who have vested interests under the lease.”). By contrast, rights of
first refusal in a lease are subject to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities because,
while “the present interest is a tenancy for years . . . [,] the interest to be purchased is a
fee.” Id. § 230.3, at 234 (“An option to a tenant for years to purchase the fee, exercisable
at a remote time, is bad as violating the Rule [A]gainst Perpetuities.”).
118. Options and rights of first refusal that are exercisable only by optionees living at
their creation are valid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. See, e.g., Gore v.
Beren, 867 P.2d 330, 341 (Kan. 1994) (finding no violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities because the right of first refusal was personal to the parties and did not run to
successors in interest, even though agreements creating an option or preemptive right to
purchase real estate are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities). Where a right of first
refusal could be exercised by the optionee’s “heirs and assigns” beyond twenty-one years
after the optionee’s death, the common law Rule is clearly violated. See, e.g., Low v.
Spellman, 629 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Me. 1993) (reaffirmed by Pew v. Sayler, 2015 ME 120 at
¶ 22, 123 A.3d 522, 529 (Me. 2015)); see also Khwaja v. Khan, 239 N.C. App. 87, 92–93, 767
S.E.2d 901, 904–05 (2015), disc. rev. denied, 772 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 2015) (holding a right of
first refusal “binding upon and insures [sic] to the benefit of the heirs [and] successors in
interest to the parties” invalid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities
(alterations in original)).
119. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 882
(9th ed. 2013) (describing the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as “a rule of logical
proof”).
120. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may, in
its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the
Court of Appeals.”).
121. 239 N.C. App. 87, 767 S.E.2d 901 (2015).
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[t]he parties’ arguments in their briefs raise a number of
interesting issues . . . . However, we do not reach any of these
issues. Rather based on our holding in New Bar . . . , we are
compelled to conclude that the Lease provision granting the
Tenant a preemptive right violates the common law rule
against perpetuities and is, therefore, void and
unenforceable.122
One judge concurred reluctantly in the result, “writ[ing] separately to
express [her] concern that [the court] should proceed with caution in
applying the common law [Rule Against Perpetuities] to nondonative transfers . . . .”123 But the panel of the Court of Appeals that
heard Khwaja had no opportunity to proceed in any other way than
to follow the precedent set by New Bar.124 Because Khwaja was
decided unanimously, there was no automatic right of appeal, and a
petition for discretionary review was denied.125
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities can raise famously
complicated questions. Even the leading authority on the Rule
admitted that its study was “a constant school of modesty.”126
Although significant aspects of perpetuities law have been altered in
the last two decades, the Rule remains a residual source of problems,
as shown by New Bar. It is noteworthy that at the time the General
Assembly adopted USRAP in 1995, it also adopted several
companion statutes, including one limiting a right of first refusal in
gross to 30 years.127 A right of first refusal in gross is one in which the
holder of the right does not own any other interest in the land that is
subject to the right.128 While this still would not have saved a right of
122. Id. at 90, 767 S.E.2d at 903.
123. Id. at 93, 767 S.E.2d at 905 (Bryant, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 90, 767 S.E.2d at 903 (majority opinion) (deciding that the court was
“compelled to conclude” that the lease in question violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities).
125. Khwaja v. Khan, 772 S.E.2d 724, 724 (N.C. 2015).
126. GRAY, supra note 111, at xi.
127. Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 525, § 41-29, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1911, 1912 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-28 to -33 (2015)) (“An option in gross with respect to an interest in
land or a preemptive right in the nature of a right of first refusal in gross with respect to an
interest in land becomes invalid if it is not actually exercised within 30 years after its
creation.”). Other sections adopted in 1995 allow a thirty year wait-and-see period for
leases to commence in the future, § 41-30, and for unvested easements, § 41-31. For a
discussion of these statutes, see Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1800–05.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-28(3) (2015) (“ ‘Preemptive right in the nature of a right of
first refusal in gross with respect to an interest in land’ means a preemptive right in which
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first refusal in a lease that had a theoretical life of thirty-five years, it
indicates a legislative willingness to abandon the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities in nondonative transfers. Rights of first refusal
in leases are arguably less objectionable than such rights unrelated to
other interests in the land—that is, rights in gross. “[T]he option in
gross tends to discourage the development of land by the holder of
the possessory interest, whereas the option held by one who is also
lessee tends to encourage the development of the land by the lesseeoptionee.”129 Given those incentives, it is ironic that an option in gross
is valid for thirty years, but an option in a lease exercisable for the
same period is void ab initio.130
If the Supreme Court had exercised its discretion sua sponte to
grant review of the Court of Appeals decision in New Bar, it could
have considered whether the lower court had misapplied the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities. Rather than find that the right of first
refusal continued beyond the perpetuities period, the Supreme Court
could have recognized that the right was tied to the option to renew
the lease. The right would never have been exercisable at all if the
assignee had not exercised the option to renew the lease at the end of
the first five-year term in 1993. In this view, the right of first refusal in
New Bar was not one continuous right, but a series of successive
rights that arose each time the lease was renewed. Therefore, the
right that arose in 1993 expired unexercised in 1998. Repeated
renewals of the lease made successive rights of first refusal
exercisable. Each one would fail within five years if unexercised. On
this view, the assignee in New Bar was attempting to enforce the right
of first refusal that became exercisable in 2008 and that would expire
in 2013.
Rather than—or in addition to—reviewing whether the Rule had
been properly applied by the Court of Appeals in New Bar, the
Supreme Court could have considered whether the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities should continue to apply to a right of first refusal
in a lease if it could not be exercised beyond the lease term. Other
the holder of the preemptive right does not own any leasehold or other interest in the land
which is the subject of the preemptive right.”).
129. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 207 (2d ed. 1984).
130. A right of first refusal in gross with a stated duration of more than thirty years is
not void ab initio, but void only “if it is not actually exercised within thirty years after its
creation.” § 41-29. The right of first refusal in the lease in New Bar would have expired in
2023, thirty years after 1993, if the final option to renew the lease were not exercised in
that year. See id.

95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017)

1582

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

states permit such rights even under the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities.131 The Supreme Court could also have considered
whether the common law Rule should continue to apply to
commercial transactions in general. Prominent commentators have
advocated the abandonment of the Rule in nondonative transfers:
“the rule against perpetuities is obviously not suited to the
commercial transaction. The rule against perpetuities was formulated
in the context of donative transfers of family wealth. Lives in being
plus twenty-one years has no purpose in the commercial field.”132
“The concept of remote vesting designed for future interests does not
easily or predictably apply to contract rights created by business
organizations.”133 Courts in other jurisdictions have declined to apply
the Rule “where its purposes will not be served,”134 and some have
found the adoption of USRAP a significant indicator of a change in
public policy concerning perpetuities.135 Of course, these issues of
general jurisprudential significance could not have been considered
by the Court of Appeals because they would involve overruling
earlier cases,136 something only the Supreme Court can do.
IV. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES—PERPETUAL PRIVATE
NONCHARITABLE TRUSTS
In 2010, in Brown Brothers Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson,137 a
panel of the Court of Appeals held that legislation allowing perpetual
private noncharitable trusts was constitutional.
131. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-24 (West 2016, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess. (excluding HB 2459)); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So.2d 765, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Keogh v. Peck, 147 N.E. 266, 271–72 (Ill. 1925); Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 326
N.E.2d 676, 681 (Ohio 1975).
132. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 129, at 207–08.
133. Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1800.
134. Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., 345 P.3d 1040,
1043 (Nev. 2015) (concerning an area-of-interest mineral royalty); see also Rich, Rich, &
Nance v. Carolina Constr. Corp., 35 N.C. 190, 194, 558 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2002) (“Commercial
transactions that do not violate the underlying policies behind the rule against perpetuities
. . . do not fit under the umbrella of the common law rule.”) (dictum).
135. Juliano & Sons Enter.’s., Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 593 A.2d 814, 815 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (refusing to apply the common law Rule Against Perpetuities
to nondonative commercial transfers because the USRAP “abolishes the common law and
embodies the State’s entire law on the rule”).
136. See, e.g., Vill. of Pinehurst v. Reg’l Inv. of Moore, Inc., 330 N.C. 725, 729, 412
S.E.2d 645, 646–47 (1995); Smith v. Mitchell, 301 N.C. 58, 66–67, 269 S.E.2d 608, 613
(1980).
137. 202 N.C. App. 283, 688 S.E.2d 752 (2010), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 239, 698
S.E.2d 391 (2010). In an article written before the Benson litigation, I questioned the
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On November 27, 2007, Settlor transferred property to Trustee
in trust138 for the benefit of Settlor’s three then-living children for
their lives, then to Settlor’s unborn and unascertained heirs for their
lives, generation after generation forever.139 Trustee was given a
present power of sale with respect to the trust property.140 Perpetual
private noncharitable trusts first became possible in North Carolina in
August 2007 when the General Assembly amended USRAP to allow
future interests in trusts to remain unvested in perpetuity, if the
trustee has a power of sale over trust assets exercisable within twentyone years of some life in being at the creation of the interest.141 The
living beneficiaries claimed that by allowing perpetual private
noncharitable trusts, the statute violated the North Carolina
Constitution’s prohibition of perpetuities:142 “[p]erpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed.”143 This, they argued, prohibited the state from abandoning
or modifying the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.144 The living
beneficiaries demanded that Trustee immediately terminate the trust
and distribute the assets to them.145 In response, Trustee brought
action against Settlor and the beneficiaries and moved for summary
judgment, seeking a declaration concerning the constitutionality of
constitutionality of the 2007 amendments to USRAP. John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities
in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 409–10 (2009). I do not intend to re-argue
the point here; rather I include Benson in this Article as an example of a significant
property issue resolved by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals and unreviewed by
the Supreme Court.
138. It does not appear in the facts whether the Benson Trust is a revocable or an
irrevocable trust. Trusts created in North Carolina after January 1, 2006 are revocable
unless expressly made irrevocable. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-6-602 (2015).
139. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753. In addition to Settlor’s heirs,
Settlor’s sister was also named a contingent beneficiary. Id. The quality of her interest and
the condition precedent to its vesting is not described. Id.
140. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753–54. It is not stated whether the beneficiaries’ interests
are subject to a restraint on alienation (a spendthrift provision). See id.
141. Act of August 19, 2007, ch. 41, § 1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 390 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-23(e) (2015)). Alternatively, unvested remote remainder interests
in trusts are allowable “if there exists an unlimited power to terminate the trust in one or
more persons in being.” Id.
142. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 754.
143. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34. This provision has been part of the North Carolina
Constitution since 1776. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 5, at 11, 90–91.
144. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 288, 688 S.E.2d at 756. According to the living
beneficiaries, “North Carolina courts have recognized the common law rule against
perpetuities, and specifically, its restriction of the remote vesting of future interests, as
constitutionally required to preserve the alienability of property.” Id.
145. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 754. One of the living beneficiaries represented the two
other living beneficiaries who were minors. See id. at 285 n.3, 688 S.E.2d at 754 n.3.
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the 2007 statute.146 The superior court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute and granted Trustee’s motion for summary judgment,
allowing Trustee to administer the trust according to its terms.147 All
parties other than Settlor joined in a petition for discretionary review
by the Supreme Court prior to determination by the Court of
Appeals, but the petition was denied.148
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior
court.149 Recognizing that the Benson Trust was “intended to be
perpetual,”150 the court framed the “sole issue” on appeal to be
“whether the North Carolina Constitution requires application of the
common law rule against perpetuities’ restriction of the remote
vesting of future interests in property.”151 The court concluded “it did
not.”152 In support, the court traced the history of the constitutional
provision that prohibits perpetuities to the state’s first Declaration of
Rights in 1776153 and concluded that the provision was linked to
another provision in the 1776 Constitution requiring “[t]hat the future
Legislature of this State shall regulate entails, in such manner as to
prevent perpetuities.”154 Obeying the constitutional command, in
1784, the General Assembly converted present estates in tail into

146. Id. at 284–85, 688 S.E.2d at 754. Settlor joined in Trustee’s motion, as did her
sister, a contingent beneficiary, and Settlor’s unborn heirs. Id. at 283, 688 S.E.2d at 752.
147. Id. at 285, 688 S.E.2d at 754. The case was heard by Albert Diaz, Special Superior
Court Judge for Complex Business Cases. Id.
148. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 684 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 2009) (denying
discretionary review); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court may,
in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause
for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the
Court of Appeals.”).
149. Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 291, 688 S.E.2d at 752.
150. Id. at 284, 688 S.E.2d at 753.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 287, 688 S.E.2d at 755; see N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 23.
For a discussion of this section of the 1776 Declaration of Rights, see John V. Orth, Does
the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina? 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 778–86 (1988); see
also Joshua C. Tate, Perpetuities and the Genius of a Free State, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1823,
1830–33 (2014).
154. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 43. The Constitution of 1776 comprises two separate
documents with their own section numbers: the “Declaration of Rights” and the
“Constitution.” Id. This provision was not carried forward in the North Carolina
Constitution of 1868 or in the current Constitution adopted in 1970 effective January 1,
1971. See generally N.C. CONST.; N.C. CONST. of 1868. Entails, or estates in fee tail, are
estates of indefinite duration, limited to pass only to descendants of the first taker. For a
discussion of the history of the fee tail, see Orth, supra note 153, at 767–78.
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estates in fee simple.155 The Court of Appeals concluded that “the
North Carolina Constitution’s prohibition of perpetuities prohibits
unreasonable restraints on alienation without requiring a rule
specifying a time period within which a future interest must vest.”156
The 2007 statute, therefore, did not violate the North Carolina
Constitution because the prohibition applies only to restraints on
alienation of trust property. Since Trustee in Benson had a present
power of sale with respect to the trust property, the court held that
the beneficiaries’ future interests that remained unvested for an
indefinite period of time were not unconstitutional perpetuities.157
The living beneficiaries filed notice of appeal and petitioned for
discretionary review, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,158
presumably finding that the constitutional question was not
substantial,159 and denied discretionary review, presumably finding
that the case was not significant or did not involve an important legal
principle.160 Perhaps surprised by this result, Trustee filed an
extraordinary motion asking the court to issue a per curiam order
affirming the holding of the Court of Appeals, and the living
beneficiaries filed extraordinary motions asking the court to vacate
the order dismissing their appeal and to treat their appeal as raising a

155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (2015) (“Every person seized of an estate in tail shall be
deemed to be seized of the same in fee simple.”). For a discussion of the subsequent
history of the fee tail in North Carolina, see Orth, supra note 153 at 786–93; see generally
John V. Orth, After the Revolution: “Reform” of the Law of Inheritance, 10 LAW & HIST.
REV. 33 (1992) (discussing of the abolition of the fee tail in the context of colonial and
post-Revolutionary America).
156. Benson, 202 N.C. App at 290, 688 S.E.2d at 757.
157. See id. at 291, 688 S.E.2d at 758.
158. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 364 N.C. 239, 239, 698 S.E.2d 391,
391–92 (2010) (dismissing appeal ex mero motu).
159. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2015) (“[A]n appeal lies of right to the
Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case: (1) Which
directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States
or of this State . . . .”). Section 7A-30 was amended in December 2016 to render
unavailable the appeal of right in a case decided by a panel in which there was a dissent
“until after the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered a decision in the case . . . or
until after the time for filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals
has expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for rehearing.” Act of Dec. 16,
2016, ch. 125 sec. 22.(c), § 7A-30(2), 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 10, 32.
160. See generally § 7A-31 (providing that certification after determination by the
Court of Appeals may be allowed “when in the opinion of the Supreme Court: (1) The
subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) The cause involves legal
principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State . . . ”).
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substantial constitutional question.161 The Supreme Court denied all
three motions.162
This case would have benefitted from further review. The
Supreme Court could have considered whether the lower court had
properly understood perpetuities law.163 If the North Carolina
Constitution did require application of the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, as claimed by the living beneficiaries, they would not
have been entitled to immediate distribution. When unvested future
interests are invalidated by the Rule, vested present interests are
unaffected.164 As applied to the Benson Trust, that would have meant
preserving the life interests of the living beneficiaries165 and passing
the invalid remainder interests to Settlor by resulting trust.166
Greater attention should have also been paid to the interests of
Settlor’s unborn heirs. If the 2007 statute that amended USRAP was
held unconstitutional and the unamended USRAP was thereby
restored,167 then the interests of Settlor’s unborn heirs that would vest
within ninety years would be valid. The only beneficiaries who were
certain to be disadvantaged by a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the 2007 statute were Settlor’s unborn heirs whose identities were
not ascertained within ninety years. But even at the end of ninety
161. See Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 364 N.C. 600, 600, 703 S.E.2d 157,
157–58 (2010). All three motions were filed under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which permits a court of the appellate division to suspend or vary the Rules
when necessary “[t]o prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the
public interest.” N.C. R. APP. P. 2; see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak
Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008) (discussing Rule 2).
162. Benson, 364 N.C. at 600, 703 S.E.2d at 157–58 (denying all three motions in three
separate orders).
163. In addition, the court could have considered various “procedural anomalies”
identified in Russell A. Willis III, Landmark or Mirage, N.C. LAW.’S WKLY, May 23, 2016,
at 4, 10.
164. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 877–81 (introducing the basics of
the Rule Against Perpetuities). If the Benson Trust is a revocable inter vivos trust, the
common law perpetuities period would not even have begun to run until the power to
revoke terminates.
165. Depending on the condition precedent, Settlor’s sister’s contingent interest might
have been valid.
166. “A resulting trust is an equitable reversionary interest that arises by operation of
law . . . if an express trust fails or makes an incomplete distribution . . . .” DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 416.
167. Although it was once the rule that repeal of a statute that repeals a prior statute
revives the repealed statute, this is no longer true. For a discussion of this canon of
statutory construction, see John V. Orth, Blackstone’s Rules for the Construction of
Statutes, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79, 80–
82 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009). However, the unconstitutionality of a repealing statute may
have that effect in light of the legislature’s likely intention.
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years, interests that remain unvested are subject to reformation under
USRAP “in the manner that most closely approximates the
transferor’s manifested plan of distribution”168—perhaps resulting in
the immediate distribution to them of the remaining principal.169
The constitutional question in Benson particularly deserved
further examination. The claim by the living beneficiaries that the
North Carolina Constitution incorporates the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities was thinly supported. Only two North Carolina
cases were cited: a Supreme Court decision repeating the
unremarkable proposition that the common law Rule is a rule of law,
to be applied “irrespective of the question of intention,”170 and a
Court of Appeals decision that the Rule “has the continuing sanction
of Article I, Section 34 of our State Constitution.”171 It was generally
accepted at the time that the Court of Appeals did not mean that the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities was constitutionally
required,172 and in 1995 the General Assembly acted on that
assumption when it adopted USRAP and the companion statutes,173
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-17 (2015).
169. According to one commentator, under the terms of the Benson Trust distributions
are discretionary and income may be accumulated indefinitely. Willis, supra note 163, at 4.
If so, the principal at termination could be substantial. But indefinite accumulation of
income would raise a question under the common law rule against accumulations, which
prohibits accumulations beyond the perpetuities period. An amendment to North
Carolina perpetuities law adopted in 2014, seven years after the execution of the Benson
Trust, exempts trusts from the common law rule against accumulations. § 41-23(h).
170. Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 103 52 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1949) (citing N.C. CONST.
of 1868 art. I, § 31). The Court of Appeals in Benson failed to recognize that the sections
of the Declaration of Rights had been renumbered in 1971, and thought that “[t]he
Supreme Court erroneously cited section 31 of the Declaration of Rights, which addresses
the quartering of soldiers. The relevant constitutional provision addressing perpetuities is
section 34.” Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 202 N.C. App. 283, 288 n.7, 688
S.E.2d 752, 757 n.7 (2010). On the nature of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see GRAY,
supra note 111, § 629 (“The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a
peremptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less
artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention.”).
171. N.C. Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 180, 203 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1974).
172. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 76 (1993) (“Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals has mentioned in
passing that the application of [the common law Rule Against Perpetuities] has the
‘continuing sanction’ of [section 34] . . . [this] should not be taken to mean that the Rule
Against Perpetuities in its present formulation is beyond the reach of the legislature.”).
173. See Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 525, art. 3 § 41-29, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1911, 1912
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-28 to -33 (2015)); Rich, Rich, & Nance v. Carolina
Constr. Corp., 355 N.C. 190, 194, 558 S.E.2d, 77, 79 (2002) (assuming validity of USRAP);
see also Benson, 202 N.C. App. at 288–89, 688 S.E.2d at 756 (“The General Assembly’s
modification of the common law rule against perpetuities through passage of the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (‘USRAP’) in 1995 supports our interpretation of the
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all of which permitted departures from the Rule.174 The question of
whether the Constitution incorporates the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities was easily answered in the negative.
Further review of Benson would have allowed the Supreme
Court to decide what the constitutional ban on perpetuities forbids—
or, alternatively, what it allows. Analysis would have been materially
aided by recognition of the distinction between legal and equitable
interests in trusts. “The hallmark characteristic of a common law trust
is bifurcation: The trustee holds legal title to the trust property, but
the beneficiaries have equitable or beneficial ownership.”175 Stated in
these terms, the issue in Benson is whether the North Carolina
Constitution permits the remote vesting of future equitable interests
in property.
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the state’s first
constitution associated perpetuities with entails and directed the
legislature to “regulate entails, in such manner as to prevent
perpetuities.”176 When complying with that direction in 1784, the
General Assembly explained that the North Carolina Constitution
declared perpetuities to be “contrary to the genius of a free state”177
because “entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and
importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an
unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold
instances the source of great contention and injustice.”178 The living
beneficiaries in Benson candidly acknowledged that the constitutional
ban on perpetuities had been adopted “in the context of estate entails
rule as one acceptable method for regulating unreasonable restraints on alienability rather
than as a constitutionally required rule.”).
174. If the Constitution required the application of the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, the statutes allowing a thirty year wait-and-see period, North Carolina
General Statutes §§ 41-29 (options in gross), 41-30 (leases to commence in the future), and
41-31 (unvested easements), would have been unconstitutional. In addition, three other
statutes adopted at the same time, § 36A-145 (honorary trusts), § 36A-146 (trusts for pets),
and § 36A-147 (trusts for cemetery lots), which permitted trusts without ascertainable
beneficiaries, would also have been unconstitutional. Act of June 13, 1995, ch. 225, art. 14,
1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 1–2 (repealed by Act of July 15, 2005, ch. 192 art. 9, 2005 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1, 53 (codified at N.C. GEN STAT. § 36C9-901 (d)(1)(f) (2005))). For a discussion of
the latter statutes, see Link & Licata, supra note 113, at 1805–07. These statutes have since
been repealed and replaced by the North Carolina Uniform Trust Code. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 36c-1-101 to -11-1106.
175. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 119, at 393.
176. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 43.
177. Id. Declaration of Rights, § 23.
178. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § V, reprinted in 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
574 (Walter Clark ed. 1904).
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that kept property within one family for generations.”179 Although the
1784 legislation ended entails, successive North Carolina
Constitutions in 1868 and 1971 continued to forbid “perpetuities,”
suggesting that something other than legal estates such as fees tail
were prohibited.180 The 2007 statute that amended USRAP
eliminated restrictions on the duration of unvested equitable interests
in trusts, allowing the creation of perpetual trusts tying up property in
one family for generations, commonly known as “dynasty trusts”—
recognized to be “a sort of throwback to entail[s].”181 The ultimate
issue in Benson, unreviewed by the Supreme Court, is whether the
constitutional ban on perpetuities prohibits entails in function, as well
as in form.182
V. EASEMENTS—CONTINUING ENCROACHMENT
In 2007, in Pottle v. Link,183 a panel of the Court of Appeals
held that an action to enjoin a continuing encroachment is subject to
the running of the six-year statute of limitations for injury to an
easement.
Defendant, who owned land burdened by a thirty-foot-wide
right-of-way easement, planted and maintained trees that encroached
on the easement.184 Over the following nine to eleven years,185 the
trees grew and narrowed the right of way and created an overhanging
obstruction that prevented access by large vehicles.186 Plaintiffs, who

179. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 202 N.C. App. 283, 287, 688 S.E.2d
752, 755 (2010).
180. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31; N.C. CONST. of 1971, art. I, § 34.
181. Adam Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 235, 239 (Stanley Katz ed., 2009); see also John V.
Orth, Escaping the Malthusian Trap: Dynasty Trusts for Serious Dynasts, 17 GREEN BAG
2D 29, 30–31 (2013).
182. See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1811–12 (2014) (describing Benson’s analysis as “deeply flawed . . . .
[T]he term ‘perpetuity’ as used in the state constitution[] means an entail, in function or in
form, with reference to alienability of beneficial ownership, not merely alienability of
underlying property.”).
183. 187 N.C. App. 746, 654 S.E.2d 64 (2007), disc. rev. allowed, 663 S.E.2d 316 (N.C.
2008), appeal dismissed, 668 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. 2008), overruled in part, Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 7, 789 S.E.2d 445, 449 (2016).
184. Id. at 746–47, 654 S.E.2d at 65. Defendant and a co-defendant also erected fences
that were alleged to encroach on the right of way. Id.
185. Id. There was evidence that during that time another individual who was also
benefited by the easement had made attempts to have the encroaching vegetation
removed, but had been prevented by Defendant. Id. at 748, 654 S.E.2d at 66.
186. Id. at 747, 654 S.E.2d at 65.
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were owners of adjacent land that was benefitted by the easement,
sued for an injunction prohibiting the burdened landowner from
continuing to obstruct their right of way.187 Defendant asserted that
the action was barred by the running of a six-year statute of
limitations.188 Rejecting that defense, the superior court granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.189
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the judgment of the
superior court.190 The issue as presented on appeal was which of two
statutes of limitations applied to the action: the six-year statute of
limitations for “injury to any incorporeal hereditament,”191 or the
twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession.192 A
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals rejected Plaintiffs’
argument that the twenty-year adverse possession statute applied
since Plaintiffs were not claiming an interest in fee but rather were
seeking to enjoin an injury to their easement.193 In consequence, it
ruled that the proper limitations period was six years and that the
Plaintiffs’ action was therefore barred.194 Plaintiffs petitioned for
discretionary review, and two utility companies, presumably
concerned about the implications for their extensive network of utility
easements, sought and received leave to file amicus briefs in

187. Id., 654 S.E.2d at 66. An easement owner has a right to maintain the easement.
Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 610, 290 S.E.2d 593, 598 (1982); JON W. BRUCE
& JAMES W. ELY, JR., LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 8:37 (1988). In
consequence, Plaintiffs might have been better advised to remove the obstructions
themselves. If Defendant had prevented them, they could then have sought an injunction
to prevent interference.
188. Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 748, 654 S.E.2d at 66.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 752, 654 S.E.2d at 68. The court remanded the case for a determination of
the location of the fences. Id.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-46 (2015) (“The periods prescribed for the commencement of
actions, other than for the recovery of real property, are as set forth in this Article.”); § 150(a)(3) (“Within six years an action . . . [f]or injury to any incorporeal hereditament.”). An
incorporeal hereditament is a non-possessory, inheritable property interest such as an
easement.
192. § 1-40 (“No action for the recovery of possession of real property, or the issues
and profits thereof, shall be maintained when the person in possession thereof, or
defendant in the action, or those under whom he claims, has possessed the property under
known and visible lines and boundaries adversely to all other persons for 20 years; and
such possession so held gives a title in fee to the possessor, in such property, against all
persons not under disability.”); see also Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 749, 654 S.E.2d at 67.
193. Pottle, 187 N.C. App. at 751, 654 S.E.2d at 68.
194. Id.
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support.195 The Supreme Court initially granted Plaintiffs’ petition196
but subsequently, on the motion of both parties, dismissed their
appeal.197
If the Supreme Court had reviewed the Pottle decision, it could
have considered the merits and clarified the law concerning
continuing injuries to an easement without the need for further
litigation. It is seemingly well settled that an easement by prescription
can be created by adverse use by a benefitted party and that the
prescriptive period is twenty years.198 Correspondingly, it seems that
an easement can be terminated by the reverse process: adverse use by
the burdened landowner for the prescriptive period.199 The root of the
problem in Pottle is that the prescriptive period for the creation and
termination of easements is not established by statute. The twentyyear statute of limitations for adverse possession is obviously
inapplicable to an action to enjoin a continuing encroachment on an
easement. The adverse possession statute limits, as its terms indicate,
an “action for the recovery of possession,” and gives a person who has
proved the elements of adverse possession “a title in fee.”200 But an
195. Pottle v. Link, 663 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 2008) (petition of Carolina Power & Light);
id. (petition of Duke Energy).
196. Pottle v. Link, 362 N.C. 361, 663 S.E.2d 316 (2008).
197. Pottle v. Link, 362 N.C. 509, 668 S.E.2d 31 (2008).
198. See WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, § 15-18[1].
To establish an easement by prescription, the party seeking to do so must show the
following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the use is adverse, hostile,
or under claim of right; (2) that the use has been open and notorious such that the
true owner had notice of the claim; (3) that the use has been continuous and
uninterrupted for at least twenty years; and (4) that there is substantial identity of
the easement claimed throughout the twenty-year period.
Id.
199. Id. § 15-32.
An easement may be extinguished through adverse user by the servient owner for
the prescriptive period. Since easements may be created by prescription, by a
reverse process they may also be lost if the servient owner refuses to recognize the
rights of the easement holder and prevents the use of the easement for the
statutory period. In order to extinguish an easement, the interference or user by
the servient owner must be adverse to the easement holder, continuous,
uninterrupted, and for the prescriptive period.
Id. “User” in this section means simply use, “the exercise or employment of a right or
property.” See User, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Adverse use by the
burdened landowner for the prescriptive period technically results in the landowner’s
acquisition of the easement, which merges with the landowner’s fee simple and thereby
terminates.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (2015).
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easement is a nonpossessory (incorporeal) interest. An easement
owner has the right to use the land of another, not the right to possess
it.201 The prescriptive period for the creation and termination of
easements was adopted by analogy to the period for acquiring a title
by adverse possession.202 Therefore, if twenty years of adverse
possession is sufficient to acquire a fee, twenty years of adverse use
should be enough to secure an easement.
Plaintiffs in Pottle were not seeking title to the land subject to the
encroachment but only an injunction to preserve their right of use.
Once it is realized that the prescriptive period is not a statutory
period but a common law limitation, the focus shifts to whether the
statute of limitations for actions for “injury to any incorporeal
hereditament”203 is appropriate for a continuing injury, such as in
Pottle, or only for a transient injury.204 A continuing encroachment on
an easement that cannot be enjoined reduces the dimensions of the
easement pro tanto. While the record title to the burdened land in
Pottle will continue to show a thirty-foot easement for the benefit of
the adjacent landowners, the easement is narrowed to the extent of
the encroachment.205 Unless an easement owner has a cause of action

201. See Pottle v. Link, 187 N.C. App. 746, 749, 654 S.E.2d 64, 67 (2007) (citing
Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 266, 192 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1972)) (describing
an affirmative easement as “a right to make some use of land owned by another without
taking a part thereof”).
202. “In most jurisdictions, the period of prescription [for the creation of easements] is
derived by analogy from the statute of limitations governing actions to recover possession
of land.” Bruce & Ely, supra note 187, § 5:17, at 5-70.
In order for an easement to be extinguished by prescription, the servient owner’s
use or possession must satisfy the same elements required for obtaining an
easement by prescription. Thus, the use or possession must be adverse, open and
notorious, and continuous and uninterrupted, and it must last for the prescriptive
period, which is generally the same period required for creating an easement by
prescription.
Id. § 10-25, at 10-66 to -67.
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(a)(3).
204. Plaintiffs should at least be entitled under the statute to an injunction to prevent
the encroachment from growing further over the next six years.
205. This is presumably what is meant by the comment in an influential treatise on
North Carolina property law: “The holding of Pottle is not necessarily inconsistent” with
the law concerning the termination of an easement by twenty years’ adverse use.
WEBSTER, JR., supra note 79, § 15-32 n.289. For a discussion of the ambiguity lurking in
the words “burden of an easement,” see ORTH, supra note 57, at 57–62.
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to remove such an encroachment, the easement owner does not own
the easement to its full extent. Without a remedy, there is no right.206
In 2014, the precedent set in Pottle was followed by the Court of
Appeals in Duke Energy Carolinas v. Gray.207 In that case,
Defendant’s house was constructed on a portion of the utility
company’s easement.208 Although Duke Energy discovered the
encroachment and demanded its removal, the company waited more
than six years to file suit seeking an injunction.209 The trial court
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and a unanimous
panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.210 The judges of
the intermediate appellate court commented,
even if we agreed with plaintiff that Pottle was wrongly decided,
we would nonetheless be bound by its holding. “Where a panel
of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a
different case, a subsequent panel is bound by that precedent,
unless it has been overturned by an intervening decision from a
higher court.” In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d
30, 37 (1989). Accordingly, we do not address plaintiff’s
arguments regarding the substantive merits of the Pottle
decision.211
Unlike Pottle and the other cases discussed in this Article, in
which decisions of subsequent panels that applied a precedent set by a
prior panel went unreviewed because the Supreme Court either failed

206. Although a legal maxim proclaims “ubi jus ibi remedium,” HERBERT BROOM,
LEGAL MAXIMS *191 (8th American ed. 1882), the converse is also true: where there is no
remedy, there is no right. For examples of the latter, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
4–5, 52, 107 (1987).
207. 237 N.C. App. 420, 766 S.E.2d 354 (2014), rev’d, 369 N.C. 1, 3, 789 S.E.2d 445, 446
(2016). In 2015 a superior court, following the precedent set in Pottle, ruled that the sixyear statute of limitations for injury to an incorporeal hereditament applied to an action
seeking a declaratory judgment that an easement had been terminated by adverse use. See
Lewis v. Hedgepeth, No. COA15-914, 2017 WL 1079620, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 21,
2017) (unpublished) (explaining the “long-running legal dispute” between the parties). On
appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals held the case in abeyance awaiting the
Supreme Court’s decision in Duke Power. See Hedgepeth v. Parker’s Landing Prop.
Owners Ass’n Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ 781 S.E.2d 822, 823–25 (2016). After the
Supreme Court overruled Pottle, the panel reversed and remanded the case. Lewis v.
Hedgepeth, No. COA15-914, 2017 WL 1079620, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2017).
208. Duke Energy, 237 N.C. App. at 423, 766 S.E.2d at 356.
209. See id. at 425, 766 S.E.2d at 358.
210. Id. at 424, 430, 766 S.E.2d at 357, 361.
211. Id. at 429, 766 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C.
373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)).
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to certify the case on its own motion (Kotis)212 or denied a petition for
discretionary review (Khwaja),213 Duke Energy’s petition for
discretionary review was allowed.214 In 2016, the Supreme Court
overturned the precedent set by the Court of Appeals in Pottle nine
years earlier: “[W]e overrule the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Pottle v. Link, insofar as that opinion deemed [North Carolina
General Statutes] Section 1-40 inapplicable to actions involving
encroachments on easements.”215
Although the Supreme Court did not clarify which suits for
“injury to [an] incorporeal hereditament” would be barred by the sixyear statute of limitations, it did indicate that the twenty-year period
for adverse possession was applicable to “actions involving
encroachments on easements”—at least, to encroachments of a
permanent character.216 Presumably twenty years obstruction of an
easement by the burdened landowner would be required to terminate
an easement, just as twenty years of adverse use would give rise to an
easement by prescription.
It took a determined and deep-pocketed plaintiff to undertake a
challenge to a precedent set by a panel of the Court of Appeals in the
certain knowledge that it would suffer defeat in the trial court and a
unanimous adverse judgment in the Court of Appeals, in the hope
that it would ultimately be able to convince the Supreme Court to
overturn the precedent.
VI. LOOKING FORWARD—THE EN BANC PROCEDURE AND THE
FUTURE ROLE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
There is reason to hope that the new en banc procedure of the
Court of Appeals will bring benefits to the Appellate Division of
North Carolina’s General Court of Justice.217 It will give the Court of
Appeals a corporate character for the first time, making it more than
a mere collection of panels.218 It will eliminate the risk that a
randomly chosen group of three Court of Appeals judges will create a

212. See supra text accompanying note 78.
213. See supra text accompanying note 125.
214. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 773 S.E.2d 57, 57 (N.C. 2015).
215. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray 369 N.C. 1, 7, 789 S.E.2d 445, 449 (2016).
216. Id.
217. See generally Orth, supra note 21 (discussing the potential benefits an en banc
procedure could bring to the North Carolina Court of Appeals).
218. Id. at 1982 (referring to the Court of Appeals without a procedure for sitting en
banc as “not a single court at all, but only a collection of panels”).
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precedent, binding all other panels of the court, with which a majority
of the judges disagree.219 This may reduce unnecessary appeals to the
Supreme Court and will provide a more fully developed record for
appeals that the Supreme Court does accept.220
On the other hand, the new en banc procedure will increase the
workload of a court that is already very busy, and that will be coping
with its increased workload with fewer judges as the size of the court
is progressively reduced.221 The judges will be expected to monitor
filings and be prepared to call for an en banc hearing in cases they
deem appropriate. They will be expected to review the decisions of all
other panels and to decide whether to call for rehearing en banc.
They will be required to decide motions for rehearing en banc—
motions that may be filed frequently, as there is reason to fear that
criminal defense lawyers will feel bound to move for rehearing in any
case in which their client’s appeal is rejected by a panel. And, of
course, they will be required to decide cases accepted by a majority of
the judges for hearing or rehearing en banc. Moreover, the new
statute increases the Court of Appeals caseload by adding appeals
from the special three-judge Superior Court, if that court holds a state
statute “facially invalid” for violation of the North Carolina
Constitution or federal law, or if the three-judge panel declares
invalid an act redistricting congressional or legislative districts.222
Before weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the en
banc procedure however, two serious questions concerning the new
statute need to be addressed. A suggestion has been made that the
North Carolina Constitution prohibits the Court of Appeals from
sitting en banc.223 Referring to the Court of Appeals, the state
constitution provides that it “may be authorized to sit in divisions, or
other than en banc.”224 Although the constitutional text can be read to
219. Id. (observing that “[a]lthough further thought or practical experience may
convince a later panel of the unsoundness or impracticality of a rule,” without a procedure
for sitting en banc the rule “must continue to be applied until overruled by the supreme
court”).
220. Id. (observing that an en banc procedure may eliminate “needless appeals to a
higher court” and will provide “a fully developed record” for those that do go forward).
221. See supra note 10. In the last two decades, the Court of Appeals has consistently
heard more than a thousand cases a year. Orr, supra note 14, at 217.
222. Act of Dec. 16, 2016, ch. 125, sec. 22.(a), § 7A-16, 2016 N.C. Sess. Law 10, 30.
223. David Donovan, Assembly Rushes Appellate Changes, N.C. LAW.’S WKLY, Dec.
26, 2016, at 6. (“The courts will likely also have to decide whether en banc hearings are
permitted under the state’s constitution.”).
224. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 7. The Court of Appeals was never authorized to sit in
divisions, either geographic divisions or subject matter divisions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16

95 N.C. L. REV 1561 (2017)

1596

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

prohibit the General Assembly from authorizing the Court of
Appeals to sit en banc, the text can also be read simply to allow the
legislature to authorize sitting other than en banc.225 This question
would seem to require resolution by the Supreme Court before the en
banc procedure can be accepted.226
An additional question may arise concerning the holding of the
Supreme Court that gave the decision of a panel of the Court of
Appeals precedential value: “Where a panel of the Court of Appeals
has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent
panel is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by an
intervening decision from a higher court.”227 Is the Court of Appeals
hearing a case en banc bound by a precedent set by a three-judge
panel of that court in a prior case? The answer may simply be that the
Court of Appeals sitting en banc is not “a subsequent panel.”
Alternatively, it may be that the Court of Appeals sitting en banc is
“a higher court,” enabled to overturn a precedent set by a three-judge
panel.228 This question too would seem to require resolution by the
Supreme Court in an appropriate case.
CONCLUSION
In significant instances in the last decade, important decisions
concerning basic North Carolina property law have been made by
three-judge panels of the Court of Appeals rather than by the sevenmember Supreme Court. Constitutional questions concerning
(2015) (“The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of three judges each . . . .”). The North
Carolina Courts Commission, established in 1963 to advise the General Assembly on the
creation of the Court of Appeals, expressly recommended against “dividing the State into
a number of geographic divisions.” N.C. COURTS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 8.
225. See Orth, supra note 21 at 1985 (“In context, the express constitutional permission
to authorize sittings ‘other than en banc’ seems designed to rebut a possible inference that
the judges of the court of appeals necessarily would, like the supreme court, always sit en
banc.”).
226. Although the Supreme Court’s prompt issuance of Rule 31.1 implementing the en
banc procedure may be taken as Supreme Court acceptance of its constitutionality, the
rule was issued without an adversarial proceeding in which opposing arguments could be
heard. SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA, ORDER ADOPTING RULE 31.1 OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 369 N.C. ___, ___ (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/Rule-31.1.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9L4-C6R4].
227. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (N.C. 1989).
228. Unanswered is whether a decision made by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc
that is subsequently affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court would have
precedential value. See generally Orth, supra note 19 (suggesting that “a court of appeals
decision affirmed by an equally divided supreme court could be allowed to have
precedential value,” despite its lacking such value under current North Carolina case law).
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whether the state can seize the interest earned on an asset in the
state’s custody (Rowlette)229 and whether it can allow perpetually
unvested interests in private trusts (Benson)230 have been decided
without the high court’s review. Important decisions concerning the
law of landlord and tenant—whether a tenant’s ex ante waiver of a
commercial landlord’s duty to mitigate damages is contrary to public
policy (Sylva Shops)231 and whether public policy requires the
application of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities to rights of
first refusal in leases (New Bar)232—have also been functionally
delegated by the Supreme Court to panels of the Court of Appeals.
And a fundamental conflict in statutes of limitation concerning
actions for possession of real property and actions for injury to
nonpossessory property interests (Pottle)233 has been left for
resolution by a panel of the intermediate appellate court. In each of
these cases, the precedent set by the panel of the Court of Appeals
binds all subsequent panels that confront the same issue. Only in the
last case was the issue belatedly addressed by the Supreme Court, and
then only because of the persistence of a major corporation.
In the constitutional cases (Rowlette and Benson), appeals of
right were dismissed, presumably because the Supreme Court did not
consider the constitutional question in each case to be “substantial.”
In the two landlord-tenant cases (Sylva Shops and New Bar) and in
the case concerning the statutes of limitations (Pottle), the decisions
went unreviewed by the Supreme Court, either because no review
was sought and review sua sponte was not granted (Sylva Shops and
New Bar) or because the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the
parties (Pottle). In all three cases, the precedents set were soon
followed by subsequent panels of the Court of Appeals (Kotis,
Khwaja, and Duke Power), despite some uneasiness expressed by
judges in the latter two cases. In only one of the subsequent cases did
the Supreme Court grant discretionary review (Duke Power).
According to the original plan, the intermediate appellate court
was intended to relieve an overworked Supreme Court of the burden
of correcting error in routine cases in order to allow it the opportunity
to give extended consideration to cases of general jurisprudential
significance. Over the years, that plan has been lost sight of, and the
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.
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Court of Appeals has become in many such cases the de facto court of
last resort. Facing the likelihood of adverse decisions in the trial and
intermediate appellate courts, only well-resourced litigants adversely
affected by a precedent set by a panel of the Court of Appeals will be
able to seek the attention of the Supreme Court. And the Supreme
Court’s historic role in developing the state’s common law will in
many instances be surrendered to the lower court.

